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Several studies have examined the effects of state cigarette tax increases on youth substance use over
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We advance the literature by using data from the 1991-2005 waves of the national Youth Risk Behavior
Surveys (YRBS), providing information on over 100,000 high school age youths.  We also are the
first to make use of hundreds of independently fielded state and local versions of the YRBS, reflecting
data from over 750,000 youths.  Importantly, these data are to our knowledge the only sources of relevant
information on youth smoking that were explicitly designed to be representative of the sampled state
or locality.  We estimate two-way fixed effects models of the effect of state cigarette taxes on youth
smoking, controlling for survey demographics and area and year fixed effects.  Our most consistent
finding is that -- contrary to some recent research -- the large state tobacco tax increases of the past
15 years were associated with significant reductions in smoking participation and frequent smoking
by youths.  Our price elasticity estimates for smoking participation by high school youths are generally
smaller than previous cross-sectional approaches but are similar to recent quasi-experimental estimates.
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1.  Introduction 
Voters in the state of California recently rejected the largest potential tobacco tax 
increase in history: a 13 cent tax increase per cigarette, or a $2.60 increase in the tax on a 
pack of 20 cigarettes.  Television ads in support of “Prop 86” indicated that the new tax 
would “reduce teen smoking by 43 percent.”  The magnitude of this figure reflects the 
conventional wisdom in research and policy circles that the smoking behaviors of youths 
and young adults are highly sensitive to price, more so than for adults who as a group 
may have better established habits. 
  Despite this conventional wisdom, however, a series of recent studies in the 
economics literature has called into question whether higher cigarette taxes will “put out 
the fires”.  Using panel data on youths from the National Educational Longitudinal Study 
(NELS), DeCicca et al. (2002) find that once time-invariant state fixed effects are 
accounted for, youth smoking initiation is statistically unrelated to cigarette taxes.  More 
recently, DeCicca et al. (2004, 2006) argue that the strong negative cross sectional 
association between cigarette taxes and youth smoking may be more properly attributable 
to cross-state differences in previously unobserved state anti-smoking sentiment.  Using 
novel data on adult attitudes about smoking, DeCicca et al. (2006) create state-specific 
measures of anti-smoking attitudes; once they account for this anti-smoking variable in 
the cross section, the negative price coefficient becomes small and statistically 
insignificant. 
  These recent findings stand in contrast to a body of research that has found teens 
to be responsive to the price of cigarettes, usually proxied by state excise taxes.  Much of 
the earlier work on this topic used cross-section data and found a negative relationship   3 
 
between youth smoking and state-specific prices and taxes (Lewit, Coate and Grossman 
1981, Chaloupka and Grossman 1996, Harris and Chan 1999, and others).  Importantly, 
however, this relationship has also been found in studies that use quasi-experimental 
methods.  These types of approaches include state fixed effects as an alternative way to 
account for factors that are typically unobserved (such as anti-smoking sentiment).  In 
this approach, within state changes in prices or taxes rather than interstate differences 
identify the teen smoking effect.  Significant tax responsiveness using this approach has 
been estimated for: 1) teen mothers (Gruber 2000, Ringel and Evans 2001, and others); 2) 
high school seniors (Dee 1999, Gruber and Zinman 2001, and others); and 3) young 
adults age 18-20 (Sloan and Trogdon 2004).  These quasi-experimental studies, however, 
return estimates of the tax responsiveness of teen smoking that differ with time period 
and sample and are not always significant.
1 
  In this paper we provide new evidence on the effects of state cigarette taxes on the 
consumption of cigarettes by high school teens.  Specifically, we use repeated cross 
section data from the national, state, and local Youth Risk Behavior Surveys over the 
period 1991-2005.  Our econometric methods are straightforward and involve regression- 
adjusted difference-in-differences estimation for all data sources, controlling for cigarette 
taxes, demographics, clean indoor air laws, and area and year fixed effects.  This 
approach effectively compares the change in outcomes for youths in states that increased 
their cigarette tax to the associated change in outcomes for youths in states that did not 
                                                 
1  Gruber (2000), for example, does not find younger teens to be responsive to prices, 
while Dee (1999) finds tax responsiveness only in the latter half of his sample period.  
Ringel and Evans (2001) find teen mothers to be least responsive to cigarette tax hikes 
(relative to older mothers), while Sloan and Trogdon (2004) find significant 
responsiveness for 18-20 year olds but not 21-24 year olds.   4 
 
experience a tax increase in that year.  Across all of our data sources, we find statistically 
significant evidence that higher cigarette taxes reduce youth smoking participation and 
frequent smoking.  Our separate analyses of the national, state, and local YRBS data 
suggest that a one-dollar increase in the tax per pack would reduce smoking participation 
by 3-6 percentage points, or about 10-20 percent.  These estimates translate into price 
elasticities of smoking participation for high school youths in the range -.23 to -.56, 
which are slightly lower than most previous cross-sectional estimates but very similar to 
other recent quasi-experimental approaches. 
  Our research makes several contributions to the literature.  First, we extend 
previous national YRBS analyses (which have only used data through 1997) by making 
use of data through 2005, the most recent year of the biennial survey.  Using these more 
recent data allows us to consider over twice as many cigarette tax increases as in previous 
research using the national YRBS.  Moreover, many of these tax hikes in the period 
following the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between US states and the 
major cigarette companies were quite large.  Few quasi-experimental studies have 
examined tax responsiveness in the post-MSA era (Sloan and Trogdon (2004) and Tauras 
et al. (2005) are important exceptions). 
  Second, we provide new estimates from hundreds of state and local versions of 
the YRBS coordinated by state and local public health departments.  Together these 
surveys include over three quarters of a million high school students over the period 
1993-2005.  Specifically, we use published aggregate statistics from these data to 
estimate weighted least squares models of youth substance use in a common quasi-
experimental framework.  No previous research has used these data to estimate the tax   5 
 
responsiveness of youth smoking.  A major advantage of these data is that – unlike nearly 
all of the youth survey data used previously to estimate the tax/smoking relationship 
(including Monitoring the future (MTF), national Youth Risk Behavior Surveys (YRBS), 
NELS, the National Household Surveys on Drug Abuse (NHSDA) and the National 
Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 1997 (NLSY97)) – these state and local YRBS surveys 
were explicitly designed to be representative of the sampled state or locality.  As such, 
we are able to provide suggestive evidence on the degree of bias from using non-
representative surveys – an oft-cited limitation of this literature. 
  Finally, we provide new results on the importance of controlling for state anti-
smoking sentiment, as recently highlighted by DeCicca et al. (2006).  Specifically, we 
use YRBS data to replicate their main qualitative finding that the cross-sectional 
association between cigarette taxes and youth smoking is reduced when we directly 
control for state adult anti-smoking sentiment (which itself is strongly and inversely 
related to youth smoking).  Despite this, the tax estimate on youth smoking remains 
negative and statistically significant even after controlling for anti-smoking sentiment in 
the cross section.  We also show inclusion of anti-smoking sentiment does not alter the 
conclusions drawn from our preferred difference-in-differences models. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we outline the empirical challenges 
facing researchers in this literature and describe a handful of studies that use quasi-
experimental methods to evaluate the effects of state cigarette taxes on youth smoking.  
Section 3 presents the data and empirical approach, and Section 4 presents the results.  
Section 5 offers a discussion and concludes. 
   6 
 
2. Motivation, Empirical Challenges, and Literature Review 
A review of the microeconometric literature relating state cigarette taxes to youth 
smoking is beyond the scope of this paper; we direct readers to Chaloupka and Warner 
(2000) for an excellent review.  Briefly, however, we note that a critical issue in this 
research area has been the difficulty in accounting for typically unobserved state anti-
smoking sentiment.  The concern is that state cigarette taxes and other tobacco control 
policies are likely to be correlated with preferences of individuals in those states.  In a 
typical cross section analysis, this problem will tend to attribute too much explanatory 
power to taxes and tobacco control policies; even in the absence of a true “causal” effect 
of taxes on youth smoking, for example, this unobserved state anti-smoking sentiment 
might produce a spurious negative association between state taxes and youth smoking. 
  To be certain, researchers have long recognized this fundamental omitted 
variables bias problem, and a variety of approaches have been used to address these 
concerns.  Several studies in this literature, for example, attempt to proxy for unobserved 
state anti-smoking sentiment by including controls for whether respondents live in 
tobacco producing states – where anti-smoking sentiment is likely to be low.  Another 
common approach is to include a control for aggregate, overall cigarette consumption in 
the state (either current or lagged), while other studies include controls for percent of 
state residents that belong to various religions.  To the extent that these variables capture 
the previously unmeasured state anti-smoking sentiment, their inclusion should reduce 
the severity of the bias on the tax and other policy coefficients in a model of youth 
smoking.   7 
 
  An alternative approach for dealing with state anti-smoking sentiment has been to 
estimate models that include year and state fixed effects.  The advantage of this approach 
is that it removes any time-invariant characteristics about states that are likely to bias tax 
coefficients in models of youth smoking.
2  Indeed, to the extent that state anti-smoking 
sentiment does not change over time, this approach unambiguously purges tax and other 
policy estimates from the associated bias.  Of course, there are a handful of issues related 
to the feasibility of state fixed effects models.  First, they require multiple observations 
on states; one-time cross-sectional surveys cannot support inclusion of state dummies.  A 
second complication of the quasi-experimental approach is that – even with repeated 
observations on states – the empirical set up requires variation in the variable of interest 
within states over time (else the tax variable will be perfectly collinear with state 
dummies).  That is, the data must span a period witnessing state changes in excise taxes 
on cigarettes or other changes in public policy toward youth smoking.
3 
  Several studies using this quasi-experimental method have found strong evidence 
that youth smoking responds to tax changes.  Ringel and Evans (2001) used smoking 
information from birth certificate records for teen mothers over the period 1989-1995.  
They found significant tax responsiveness of smoking participation among these young 
mothers in state fixed effects models, though the estimated sensitivity for teens was not 
greater than for older women.  Dee (1999) used data from the Monitoring the Future 
                                                 
2 This approach to estimating price effects on health-behavior choices was introduced by 
Cook and Tauchen (1982) and has become standard in the econometric literature (Cook 
2007). 
3 A common diagnostic used to evaluate the severity of this problem in the context of 
cigarette taxes is to regress the tax on state and year dummies.  In this auxiliary 
regression, a high R-squared (upwards of .90) is usually viewed as problematic.  Our data 
spanning many tax changes largely avoids this problem: the R-squared from a regression 
of taxes on state and year dummies in the 1991-2005 YRBS is just .70.   8 
 
study over the 1977-1992 period to estimate effects of state cigarette taxes on youth 
smoking and drinking participation.  He found a robust own-price effect on smoking for 
youths, but only in the latter part of the sample period.  Gruber (2001) and Gruber and 
Zinman (2000) pooled data from the first four waves of the national YRBS (1991-1997) 
and estimated reduced form models of youth cigarette consumption as a function of 
individual demographic characteristics, state excise taxes on cigarettes, and clean indoor 
air laws.  They found a modest tax effect on consumption that was confined to older 
youths (high school seniors).
4  Sloan and Trogdon (2004) used data from the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) on adults over age 18 and found a significant 
price response of smoking among young adults age 18-20 in models with state and year 
fixed effects.  Across a variety of samples, then, cigarette taxes have been shown to 
significantly reduce teen smoking even in models with state fixed effects, though not for 
every sample. 
  Despite this body of evidence, the real effects of cigarette taxes on youth smoking 
from quasi-experimental models have themselves been called into question by a series of 
recent papers that have used longitudinal data on youths from the National Educational 
Longitudinal Study (NELS:88).  This skeptical view was initiated by DeCicca et al. 
(2002), who estimated discrete time hazard models of youth smoking initiation, 
controlling for state fixed effects, and found no association between state cigarette taxes 
and youth smoking.  DeCicca et al. (2004) again reported a null finding in their analysis 
of NELS data; they used variation in effective cigarette prices faced by youths who 
                                                 
4 Gruber (2001) and Gruber and Zinman (2000) did not find consistent effects of clean 
indoor air policies on smoking participation, though there was some evidence that 
government worksite restrictions reduced smoking intensity.   9 
 
“moved” across state lines versus youths who “stayed” in a state as an alternative 
identification strategy.   
  Most recently, DeCicca et al. (2006) analyze two waves of the NELS (1992 and 
2000), and report results that support the absence of a substantive association between 
state cigarette taxes and youth smoking initiation.  This paper takes a different and novel 
approach to dealing with concerns about state anti-smoking sentiment.  Using data on 
adult attitudes about smoking from the Tobacco Use  Supplements of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) over the 1990’s and a standard factor analysis technique, the 
authors create a state-specific anti-smoking measure.  This allows them to directly control 
for a newly observed measure of state anti-smoking sentiment instead of including 
alternative proxies such as aggregate cigarette production or “tobacco producing state” 
indicators.  They found that the strong cross-sectional negative association between 
cigarette prices and youth smoking initiation was not robust to inclusion of this anti-
smoking sentiment measure.  Equally important, all of the variation in youth smoking 
“loaded onto” the anti-smoking sentiment measure, which was a statistically significant 
predictor of youth smoking in the NELS cross section.  DeCicca et al. (2006) interpret 
this result and the continued failure of state fixed effects models to return significant 
youth smoking effects in the NELS as evidence that cigarette taxes are not an effective 
means to reduce youth smoking initiation. 
  Thus it is fair to say that there is still no consensus on whether taxes have a true 
causal effect on youth participation in smoking. 
   10 
 
3. Research Design and Data Description 
To estimate the effects of state cigarette tax increases on youth smoking and drinking, we 
employ restricted use area-identified versions of the 1991-2005 national Youth Risk 
Behavior Surveys (YRBS), in conjunction with the independent state and local versions 
of the YRBS.  The national surveys – which are distinct from the state and local surveys 
and were not designed to be representative below the national level – are coordinated 
every other year by the Centers for Disease Control and are administered to high school 
students at school in the spring.
5  The purpose of the YRBS is to monitor the prevalence 
of youth behaviors that most influence health, including use of alcohol, tobacco, and 
other drugs. 
  These data provide standard demographic characteristics, information on a variety 
of behaviors, and the state of survey (requested in a restricted use version of the data 
directly through CDC).  We restrict attention to youths with no missing data on the 
demographic variables and key outcomes of interest (smoking in the past month), 
yielding over 100,000 youths.  These data have been used by economists in policy 
evaluations similar to ours (e.g. Gruber and Zinman 2001).  The YRBS data produce 
estimates of past month smoking that closely track the trends from other commonly used 
data on youths, such as the Monitoring the Future Study and the National Household 
Surveys on Drug Abuse (Gruber 2000). 
  Specifically, youths are asked: “During the past 30 days, on how many days did 
you smoke cigarettes?”  We create a variable called Smoker that equals 1 if the person 
                                                 
5 In the 2005 national YRBS, for example, a probability sample of 203 schools was 
selected from the universe of public and private schools with at least one of the grades 9-
12.  One or two classrooms from each grade of each of these sample schools was 
administered a questionnaire (MMWR 2006, p. 2).   11 
 
reported any days of smoking and zero otherwise.  We also consider an indicator variable 
called Frequent Smoker that equals 1 if the person reported smoking on at least 20 days 
in the past 30 and zero otherwise.  We chose these outcome variables because they are 
consistently reported for every state and local YRBS in the MMWR publications 
(described below).
6 
  We use a straightforward two-way fixed-effects framework to estimate the effect 
of state cigarette taxes on youth smoking in the national YRBS data.  Specifically, we use 
standard logit-regression model of the form: 
(1)   ln (pist/1- pist) = β0 + β1Xist + β2(Cigarette Tax) st + β3Zst + β4State + β5Year + εist 
where pist is the probability that the individual has smoked in the last month (or smoked 
frequently in the last month).   Xist is a vector of individual demographic characteristics, 
including dummies for: female, black, other race, Hispanic, grade, and age.  Z is a vector 
that includes the state unemployment rate and indicators for clean indoor air laws in 
venues likely to affect high school students.
7  State is a vector of state dummies, and Year 
is a vector of year dummies.  Cigarette Tax is the state tax on a pack of cigarettes in 2005 
                                                 
6 The MMWR publications do not report measures of smoking intensity other than the 
frequent smoking outcome.  Cigarettes smoked per day, for example, is not reported.  
Similarly, smokeless tobacco use (snuff or chew) is not consistently reported for the state 
or local data.  Given that we are interested in comparing tax estimates on smoking across 
the national, state, and local YRBS data, we focus attention on the outcomes consistently 
reported across all data sources. 
7 We use venue coding from the Robert Wood Johnson’s ImpacTeen program.  
Specifically, we control for restrictions in government worksites, schools, private 
worksites, shopping malls, and restaurants.  Examples of venues we exclude include child 
care centers.  Results are not sensitive to including other venues, and no venue-specific 
restriction was consistently significant in the predicted direction.  These null findings are 
similar to those from Gruber and Zinman (2000).   12 
 
dollars.
8  The coefficient of interest, β2, captures the relative effect of state cigarette taxes 
on youth smoking by comparing within area increases in state cigarette taxes to the 
associated outcomes for youths in states that did not experience a cigarette tax increase in 
that year.  Standard errors are clustered at the state level throughout (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan 2004).   
  In addition to the national YRBS, we also make use of aggregate statistics from 
the state and local YRBS.  These surveys are coordinated by public health officials in the 
respective states and include standard questions that reproduce those in the national 
survey.  As described above, an important feature of these data is that the majority of the 
state and local efforts were explicitly designed to be representative of the state or locality 
in question.  To our knowledge, these weighted state and local surveys are the only 
consistent state/year panel of representative data on smoking among high school students.  
The coverage of state surveys is extensive (see Appendix Table 5), while the local YRBS 
modules are generally concentrated in large urban centers such as Los Angeles, New 
York City, Boston, and Chicago (see Appendix Table 6 for a complete list).  The state 
and local YRBS are fielded every other year, and the aggregate estimates of the health 
outcomes based on the underlying microdata are published in Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report.  Included in each report are various characteristics for each site.  
Specifically, we observe: the relevant sample size on which the estimates are based; 
                                                 
8 These data come from The Tax Burden on Tobacco and the Campaign for Tobacco Free 
Kids.  We use the tax in effect as of March of the survey year (i.e. the current tax).  Note 
that we ignore the fact that a handful of localities also impose cigarette taxes.  We are not 
aware of a consistent state/year panel of local cigarette taxes, and previous research 
similarly does not control for local taxes.  We also estimated models that included 
controls for the square of the cigarette tax in addition to the tax itself.  The cigarette tax 
estimate was large, negative, and statistically significant while the coefficient on the 
squared tax was smaller and statistically insignificant.   13 
 
whether the survey was unweighted or weighted to be representative; the overall, student, 
and school response rates; the fraction of the school population that is white, black, other 
race, and Hispanic; the fraction of the population that is in each grade (9-12); and various 
aggregate outcomes with respect to substance use. 
  For our state and local YRBS analyses, we estimate separate weighted least 
squares models where the weights are the relevant sample sizes of the surveys on which 
the substance use rates are based.  In particular, we estimate the following OLS 
regressions: 
(2) ln(Yat /1- Yat)= β0 + β1Xat + β2(Cigarette Tax) at + β3Zat + β4Area + β5Year + εat 
where a denotes area (city or state) and t denotes survey year.  Since we only observe the 
aggregate outcomes reported in the MMWR publications, Yat is the fraction of the sample 
reporting the behavior in question (smoking or frequent smoking). Xat is a vector of 
sample characteristics that includes: overall response rate, school response rate, student 
response rate, percent grade 10, percent grade 11, percent grade 12, percent black, 
percent other race, and percent Hispanic.  The variables in Z are as described above.  
Area is a vector of either state dummies or city dummies, depending on the dataset.  Year 
is a vector of survey year dummies.  β2 is again the coefficient of interest, and standard 
errors are clustered at the state level. 
  Appendix Tables 4 – 6 present the state/year and city/year combinations for which 
we have national, state, and local YRBS data, respectively.  We also shade the area/year 
combinations in which a state increased its excise tax on cigarettes to illustrate the extent   14 
 
of within-place variation over our sample period.
9  Several patterns merit discussion.  
First, the national and state YRBS surveys have a wide but far from complete coverage of 
states.  Second, there are numerous state policy experiments with respect to excise tax 
increases that we can examine in these data.  Third, the more recent data – since 1999, for 
example – contains more data points and more policy experiments than the earlier 1991-
1997 data analyzed by previous research. 
 
4. Results 
We present descriptive statistics for the national, state, and local YRBS in Tables 1a and 
1b.  The national YRBS data suggest that over the entire period almost 30 percent of high 
school youths smoked cigarettes in the past month, and 13 percent smoked on at least 20 
of the previous 30 days.  The state YRBS surveys produce similar rates of past month 
smoking (Table 1b) but the local YRBS produce lower estimates.  This difference likely 
reflects the fact that the local surveys were concentrated in urban areas; only 19 percent 
of the local samples are white students, for example.  As such, the lower rates in the local 
YRBS data are explained by the well-documented lower rates of teen smoking by non-
white youths.  Table 1b also illustrates the key advantage of these local and state surveys: 
the vast majority were explicitly designed to be representative (88 and 79 percent, 
respectively). 
                                                 
9 Note that because the surveys are administered at schools in the Spring, we are not able 
to use all of the policy changes shaded in the Tables.  If a state changed its excise tax in 
the fall, for example, we highlight it in the Tables but any data observed in that year is 
coded as being from the “pre” tax period.  In all cases, we assume the surveys were 
administered in March of the survey year.  Individual discussions with survey 
administrators and the CDC highlighted that while there is no way to verify when surveys 
were administered, February and March are common months for administration of the 
YRBS.   15 
 
  Table 2 presents the baseline cross-section and quasi-experimental estimates for 
the outcome indicating any smoking in the past month from the national, state, and local 
YRBS data.  Across all three data sources we find consistent evidence that state excise 
taxes on cigarettes are negatively related to youth smoking participation.  Importantly, we 
find that the difference-in-differences estimates (based on regressions with fixed effects 
included) are somewhat smaller than the “cross section” estimates without fixed effects, 
consistent with the idea that the cross section estimates are biased because unobserved 
state characteristics are correlated with cigarette taxes and smoking outcomes.  Even after 
accounting for time-invariant area characteristics, however, we find across all three data 
sources that increases in state cigarette taxes significantly reduce youth smoking 
participation.  Appendix Table 1 presents detailed coefficients on the control variables in 
the smoking participation model using the national YRBS data.
10 
  In Table 3 we present the estimates from the frequent smoking outcome (defined 
as smoking on at least 20 of the past 30 days).  The format of Table 3 mirrors that of 
Table 2, with similar coefficient estimates (although in this case the inclusion of fixed 
                                                 
10 We also estimated models separately by race in the national YRBS data (the only 
source for which we have the microdata on race).  Tax estimates for white youths were 
slightly larger than the baseline estimates and statistically distinguishable from zero.  Tax 
estimates for nonwhite youths were negative, smaller than the baseline, and not 
statistically significant (we could not rule out either large tax responsiveness or no tax 
responsiveness).  We also considered models separately before and after the Master 
Settlement Agreement in 1998.  The pre-MSA analysis on the national YRBS data 
essentially mirrored Gruber’s (2001) finding: taxes were negatively related to youth 
smoking, but the estimates were not significant in the full sample.  The post-MSA 
observations returned imprecisely estimated null tax estimates in the national data.  We 
also performed this same exercise on the state YRBS data and obtained the opposite 
pattern: the pre-MSA tax coefficient (using only 1993, 1995, and 1997 observations) was 
an imprecisely estimated zero, while the post-MSA tax coefficient was large and 
negative.  We therefore view the investigation into pre/post MSA differences in tax 
responsiveness as inconclusive.   16 
 
effects results in larger coefficients in two of three cases).   To translate the point 
estimates from the logit regressions into something more intuitive, we compute the point 
estimate for change in probability of smoking (or frequent smoking) using as the baseline 
the mean smoking rates over the sample period from the national YRBS (29.5% for 
smoking participation and 13.5% for frequent smoking).  We provide point estimates 
based on the high and low estimates of responsiveness from the regression results.  In 
sum, a $1.00 increase in tax would reduce smoking prevalence from 29.5% to 26.8% 
(state surveys data) or 23.6% (national survey).  In other words, the reduction would be 
2.7 – 5.9 percentage points.  From the baseline of 29.5%, this is a reduction of about 9 – 
20%. 
Projections from regression estimates in Tables 2 and 3 
 





























Similarly, the reduction in the prevalence of frequent smoking ranges from 2.4 to 4.1 
percentage points, which is about 18 – 30% of the sample mean (13.5%). 
  Note that “frequent smoking” is the only measure of smoking intensity that is 
available for all three sets of YRBS surveys, and that is why we focus on this measure.   
The national survey, but not the state and city surveys, also includes an item on number 
of cigarettes smoked in the last month.  Appendix Table 1 reports the results of regressing 
that measure (in log form) on the same specification as reported in Tables 2 and 3.  The   17 
 
coefficient estimate for the tax rate is essentially zero.  Since the sample for that 
regression is restricted to smokers, this result implies that those youths who continue to 
smoke when taxes are raised smoke the same amount on average as the larger group who 
smoked at the previous (lower) tax rate.  One interpretation is that tax has no effect on the 
intensive margin for smokers.  Another interpretation is that the “zero” effect is the result 
of two processes that tend to cancel out – those who quit in response to higher taxes tend 
to be the lighter smokers (thus raising the average of those who continue), and those who 
continue smoking in fact smoke less than they otherwise would have. 
  In Table 4 we provide some evidence on the sensitivity of our main smoking 
estimates to the quantity and quality of the data.  Recall that our analyses of state and 
local YRBS data have thus far restricted attention to observations that are constructed to 
be unbiased, in the sense that sample weights were used in computing the population 
estimates.   Table 4 reprints the state and local YRBS estimates from this restricted data 
set, and also displays the results of including other state YRBS observations for which 
population estimates are computed from survey results without weighting (creating a real 
possibility of bias).  In the state YRBS analysis, this is a sizable number of observations – 
about 50, or over one quarter of the sample size when using weighted surveys only.  For 
the local YRBS analysis, the absolute discrepancy is smaller (14), but as a percentage of 
the weighted surveys (14%), it is still substantial.  The estimates in Table 4 suggest that 
restricting attention to the weighted estimates for the state YRBS analysis has very little 
effect on coefficient and standard error estimates. 
     In Table 5 we explore the robustness of our main smoking results to inclusion of 
direct controls for state anti-smoking sentiment.  Recall that this approach was recently   18 
 
used by DeCicca et al. (2006) as an alternative way to test for the strength of the cross-
sectional relationship between taxes and youth smoking, as well as to provide a 
commentary on the ability of previous approaches to appropriately capture state anti-
smoking sentiment.  We use the direct anti-smoking sentiment measures created by 
DeCicca et al. to examine whether their main empirical result holds up in the YRBS.
11
  The results of these exercises are presented in Table 5 for smoking participation.
12  
First, in Row 1 we report the cross-sectional results (without fixed effects) for the state 
cigarette tax and anti-smoking sentiment.  When entered by itself the tax coefficient is 
significantly negative (as was shown previously in Table 2).  The same is true when we 
enter sentiment directly without controlling for the state cigarette tax.  When we include 
both measures in Column 3, we reproduce the main DeCicca et al. (2006) finding: the tax 
coefficient becomes smaller, with much of the estimated variation “loading onto” the 
sentiment measure.  Notably, however, our tax estimate remains negative, sizable, and 
statistically significant at the ten percent level.  That is, using this alternative approach for 
dealing with state anti-smoking sentiment, we continue to find evidence for a significant 
role for state cigarette taxes.
13  This finding is consistent both with a significant tax 
                                                 
11 The anti-smoking sentiment measure is created from the 1992/93, 1995/96, 1998/99, 
and 2000/2001 Tobacco Use Supplements to the Current Population Survey.  This yields 
direct measures of sentiment for 1993, 1995, 1999, and 2001 in our data.  In private 
correspondence with Don Kenkel (12/08/2006) we have obtained a complete state 
specific anti-sentiment measure for all years of our sample (1991-2005) based on linear 
interpolations from the years for which direct sentiment values are observed.  Models that 
restricted attention only to those years for which the sentiment variable is directly 
observed produced similar results. 
12 Models for frequent smoking produced similar results and are not presented here to 
conserve space. 
13 The coefficient estimate suggests that a one dollar increase in cigarette taxes would 
reduce youth smoking participation by 2.8 percentage points.   19 
 
responsiveness of youth smoking and with the claim that failing to account for 
unobserved anti-smoking sentiment overstates the magnitude of this relationship. 
  In Row 2 of Table 5 we further explore this issue by presenting the associated 
difference-in-differences estimates of youth smoking in models that do and do not control 
for the state sentiment measure.  Note here that there is very little within state variation in 
state anti-smoking sentiment once state dummies are included in the model; as such, this 
exercise is not intended to be a “test” of sentiment but rather a comment on the sensitivity 
of the tax estimate to inclusion of sentiment in a model that includes state dummies.  We 
again find that in models that include state and year dummies, taxes and sentiment 
entered separately are both negatively related to youth smoking (recall that higher values 
of the sentiment measure reflect more anti-smoking attitudes).  We also find that the tax 
estimate remains largely unchanged (i.e. it is still large, negative, and statistically 
significant) once we account for state anti-smoking sentiment in the difference-in-
differences model.  Finally, we note that although the standard errors on the sentiment 
variable become much larger once we include state dummies (given their strong 
collinearity), the point estimates are largely unchanged.  That is, the limited within state 
variation in sentiment that does exist continues to have a large estimated negative 
relationship with youth smoking that is very similar to the cross-sectional estimate.  
Again, we interpret the patterns in Table 5 as consistent both with a strong effect of 
cigarette taxes on youth smoking and with the possibility that state anti-smoking 
sentiment exerts independently meaningful effects on smoking outcomes. 
  The fact that we find significant effects of the cigarette tax raises a natural 
question: do these estimates reflect “real” price effects or are they confounded by other   20 
 
changes that tended to occur at the same time and place as the tax increases?
14  To 
partially address the possibility that the tax change was linked in that sense to other 
changes influencing health behaviors, we experimented with other items found in the 
national YRBS.  Reassuringly, we found that none of the following were statistically 
related to cigarette tax increases:  the likelihood of using cocaine in the past month and 
the likelihood of carrying a weapon in the past month.
15  (The results are not reported 
here but are available upon request).  Thus, the significant cigarette tax effects we 
estimate for tobacco consumption are unlikely to be attributable to, say, coincident public 
health campaigns. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results in Tables 2-5 indicate that state cigarette tax increases of the past 15 years 
were effective at reducing smoking participation and frequent smoking by high school 
students.  Across our analyses of three distinct data sets, we find qualitatively similar 
estimates: an increase in the state cigarette tax reduces the probability a youth reports past 
30 day smoking and frequent smoking. 
  A remaining issue is whether the magnitude of our estimated cigarette tax effects 
seems reasonable.  Recall that television advertisements for the proposed $2.60 cigarette 
tax increase in California claimed that it would decrease teen smoking by 43 percent.  
How does that compare with our estimates?  If we use the mean of smoking participation 
                                                 
14 It could be, for example, that states use the funds raised from cigarette taxes to promote 
general public health initiatives.  In that case, one may worry that a negative association 
between state cigarette taxes and “bad” youth outcomes, even in the presence of state and 
year dummies, is not reflecting the effects of changing tobacco consumption per se.   
15 We also found that the likelihood of using snuff or chew in the past month was 
unrelated to cigarette taxes.   21 
 
in the national YRBS data as a baseline (29%), then from the results in Table 2, the range 
of point estimates following a $2.60 increase is from 13.6% (national survey) to 22% 
(state surveys).  The proportional reduction in the first case is 53%, even larger than the 
ad claim, but the second estimate is just a 24% reduction.  It seems fair to say that if the 
advertising is to be faulted, it is for conveying a false sense of precision rather than for 
exaggeration. 
  An alternative and useful way to think about magnitudes in this context is to 
compare the implied price elasticities from our national, state, and local YRBS analyses 
to those from the previous literature.  DeCicca et al. (2002) report from several sources 
that the “consensus” estimate regarding the price elasticity of youth smoking was about -
0.7, which suggests that a 10 percent increase in the price of cigarettes would reduce 
youth smoking by about 7 percent.  Given a mean tax in our national YRBS sample of 52 
cents, we estimate a tax elasticity of teen smoking to be -0.106.  Calculating the price 
elasticity implied by this estimate requires information on the pass through of state 
cigarette taxes to prices as well as the fraction of the total price attributable to the tax.  
The latter figure is directly calculable from our data using information on real prices from 
the Tax Burden on Tobacco; over our sample taxes constitute about 17 percent of the 
retail price.  For the pass-through of taxes to prices we use an estimate from Keeler et al. 
(1996) of 1.11; that is, a one dollar increase in taxes increases the average retail price by 
one dollar and eleven cents.  Using these estimates in conjunction with our estimated tax 
elasticity from the national YRBS data suggests a price elasticity of -0.56, which is fairly 
close to the “consensus” estimate of -0.7.  Our state YRBS estimates, however, produce a 
notably smaller tax elasticity estimate of -0.047; this translates to a teen price elasticity of   22 
 
smoking participation of about -0.25.
16  This estimate is very close to the estimate of -
0.27 reported in Sloan and Trogdon (2004) for 18-20 year olds, which also was derived 
from a model with state and year fixed effects and included the post-MSA period. 
  Several caveats and limitations are in order.  Some of these are typical to studies 
that use youth survey data to evaluate public policies regarding youth consumption of 
harmful substances.  For example, the YRBS surveys are administered to youths at 
school.  This procedure necessarily excludes youths absent from school on the survey 
day, as well as high school dropouts.  These missing youths may be more or less 
responsive to cigarette prices than those who answered the survey.  Whether our 
estimates can be reliably extended to the entire population of high-school-aged youths is 
unknown.  Second, the YRBS substance use data are all self reported.  This is an obvious 
limitation to studies such as ours, and there is little we can do to correct for systematic 
errors in reporting.   Reporting errors will lead to bias in coefficient estimates if the under 
reporting rate is systematically related to changes in state excise taxes.
17   
  It should also be noted that we have not specified the mechanisms by which an 
increase in cigarette taxes affect youth smoking decisions.  Most high-school students are 
                                                 
16 The price elasticity estimate from the city/local YRBS data falls in between these 
estimates at -0.49. 
17 Only about three percent of youths do not report information on smoking outcomes.  In 
an evaluation context we were most concerned that failure to report smoking behavior 
may be correlated with cigarette tax changes.  To evaluate this problem, we first 
estimated a model where we related the likelihood of missing information on smoking 
outcomes to the cigarette taxes; although the coefficient on the cigarette tax was positive, 
it was very small and statistically insignificant.  Specifically, we estimated that a one 
dollar increase in the state cigarette tax would increase the probability of missing data on 
smoking outcomes by .06 percentage points, or only about 2 percent.  Moreover, 
recoding all observations with missing information on smoking as past 30 day smokers 
(i.e. making the extreme assumption that all non-responders are actually smokers) did not 
change our main results: the tax coefficient in this model was very similar to the baseline 
presented below and remained statistically significant at the five percent level.   23 
 
too young to legally buy cigarettes, and most of them obtain their cigarettes from social 
sources (friends and family).  An increase in cigarette taxes may make potential sources 
more reluctant to provide youths with cigarettes, or lead them to charge more.  The 
prevalence of smoking among friends and family may also be influential through social 
contagion processes (Krauth 2005, Powell and Chaloupka 2005, and others), so that the 
increase in taxes influences youth smoking indirectly by influencing the smoking rates in 
their social environment.  Perhaps the best interpretation of our results is that they reflect 
a reduced form of direct and indirect influences on youth decisions.  Regardless, these 
results offer new support for the belief that raising cigarette taxes will help discourage 
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Table 1a: Means of key variables, National YRBS 1991-2005 
  National YRBS Surveys 
   
Past 30 day smoker  .29 
Past 30 day frequent smoker (smoked on at  








Black non Hispanic  .13 
Other race  .07 
Hispanic .13 
  
Grade 9  .26 
Grade 10  .25 
Grade 11  .24 







   28 
 
Table 1b: Means of key variables, State and Local YRBS 1993-2005 
  YRBS Local Surveys  YRBS State Surveys 
Percent from representative surveys  .88  .79 
Overall response rate  .71  .65 
School response rate  .98  .81 
Student response rate  .73  .81 
    
Female .51  .50 
    
Grade 9  .33  .29 
Grade 10  .26  .26 
Grade 11  .22  .23 
Grade 12  .19  .21 
    
White .19  .68 
    
Cigarette tax (in 2005 dollars)  .62  .51 
    
Past 30 day smoker  .19  .29 
Frequent smoker  .06  .14 
State and Local YRBS means are unweighted.   29 
 
Table 2:  The effect of state cigarette taxes on youth smoking participation, Alternative 
data sets and specifications 
 
 (1)  (2)   
  “Cross Section” with 
no fixed effects 
“Diff in diff” 
With fixed effects 
N 








(2)  State YRBS data,  
1993-2005:   






(3)  City YRBS data,  
1993-2005 






      
Year indicators? 






Note: Each cell in columns 1 and 2 represent the results of a different regression. 
Demographic controls for row 1 include gender, race, grade, and age dummies.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the state level.   
Controls for rows 2 and 3 include overall response rate, school response rate, student 
response rate, percent grade 10, percent grade 11, percent grade 12, percent black, 
percent other race, and percent Hispanic 
Additional controls in all models include the state unemployment rate and ImpacTeen 
Clean Indoor Air ratings for restaurants, public schools, shopping malls, government 
worksites, and private worksites.  The cigarette taxes are entered in 2005 US dollars.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   30 
 
Table 3:  The effect of state cigarette taxes on youth frequent-smoking participation, 
Alternative data sets and specifications 
 
 (1)  (2)   
  “Cross Section” with 
no fixed effects 
“Diff in diff” 
With fixed effects 
N 








(2)  State YRBS data,  
1993-2005:   






(3)  City YRBS data,  
1993-2005 






      
Year indicators? 






Note: Each cell in columns 1 and 2 represent the results of a different regression. 
Demographic controls for row 1 include gender, race, grade, and age dummies.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the state level.   
Controls for rows 2 and 3 include overall response rate, school response rate, student 
response rate, percent grade 10, percent grade 11, percent grade 12, percent black, 
percent other race, and percent Hispanic 
Additional controls in all models include the state unemployment rate and ImpacTeen 
Clean Indoor Air ratings for restaurants, public schools, shopping malls, government 
worksites, and private worksites.  The cigarette taxes are entered in 2005 US dollars.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4:  The effect of state cigarette taxes on youth smoking participation, Sensitivity to 
inclusion of “unrepresentative” observations 
 
 (1)    (2)   





Dependent variables:  
Ln(p/1-p) 
     
(1)  State YRBS data,  























































Note: All models include area and year fixed effect dummies. 
Each coefficient estimate is from a different regression. 
An “unbiased” observation is a weighted average of survey responses for a particular 
year and state or city; the weights are computed to produce an unbiased estimate of the 
population rate for that area and year.  
All models are estimated using least squares, weighted by the sample size on which each 
observation is based. 
Controls in all models include the overall response rate, school response rate, student 
response rate, percent grade 10, percent grade 11, percent grade 12, percent black, 
percent other race, and percent Hispanic state unemployment rate and ImpacTeen Clean 
Indoor Air ratings for restaurants, public schools, shopping malls, government worksites, 
and private worksites.   
The cigarette taxes are entered in 2005 US dollars.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   32 
 
Table 5:  The effect of state cigarette taxes and state anti-smoking sentiment on youth 
smoking participation, National YRBS data 1991-2005 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   





(1)  “Cross section” 



































(2)  “Diff in Diff”  







































Each cell contains results from a different regression. 
 
All models are estimated using least squares, weighted by the sample size on which each 
observation is based. 
Controls in all models include the state unemployment rate and ImpacTeen Clean Indoor 
Air ratings for restaurants, public schools, shopping malls, government worksites, and 
private worksites.   
The cigarette taxes are entered in 2005 US dollars.   




    
Appendix Table 1: Expanded set of coefficient estimates 
Logit coefficients reported for Smoking Participation Outcome 
Outcome for Smoking Intensity is log of the # cigarettes smoked last month (among 
smokers) using OLS 
1991-2005, National YRBS 
Variable  Smoking Participation  Smoking Intensity 






    




















    






















    
R squared  .044  .072 
N 101633  27028 
See notes to Table 2.  A full set of state, year, age, and grade dummies are also included 
but not reported.  They are available upon request. 
    
Appendix Table 2: 
Distribution of states and cities by # years observed 
# years observed in 
sample 
# states in national 
YRBS 
# states in state 
YRBS 
# cities in local 
YRBS 
1 7 3 5 
2 7 3 5 
3 4 5 3 
4 5 6 4 
5 4 2 1 
6 10  14 4 
7  3 14 5 




Appendix Table 3: 
Number of site observations in each year and data source 
# years observed in 
sample 
# states in that year 
in national YRBS 
# states in that year 
in state YRBS 
# cities in that year 
in local YRBS 
1991 22 N/A  N/A 
1993  28 31 11 
1995  24 32 14 
1997  28 34 15 
1999  22 34 13 
2001  29 35 17 
2003  28 33 16 





     
Appendix Table 4: 
N indicates national YRBS data for that state in that year 
Shaded Cell Indicates State Increased Cigarette Tax That Year or Previous Year 
Location  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Alabama    N N N N N N  
Alaska          
Arizona  N   N  N  N  N N 
Arkansas   N N N     N  
California N N N N N N N N 
Colorado  N N N N   N    
Connecticut      N      N 
Delaware    N     N  
DC     N       
Florida  N N N N N N N N 
Georgia  N N N N N N N N 
Hawaii       N     
Idaho       N   N 
Illinois N  N N   N N N N 
Indiana  N      N  N N 
Iowa    N  N     N 
Kansas   N    N      N N 
Kentucky         N 
Louisiana    N  N  N    N N 
Maine   N  N  N N N N  
Maryland  N N   N   N  
Massachusetts   N N N   N N N 
Michigan N N N N N N N  N 
Minnesota    N       N 
Mississippi  N N N N N N    
Missouri N  N N   N N N N 
Montana       N      
Nebraska   N           
Nevada       N    
NewHampshire  N           
New Jersey  N    N  N N N  N 
New Mexico  N  N   N   N N  
New York  N  N N N N N  N N 
North Carolina    N N N N N   N 
North Dakota           
Ohio N  N N N N N N  N 
Oklahoma     N   N    N 
Oregon   N      N    N 
Pennsylvania  N N N N N   N  N 
Rhode Island         N       
South  Carolina  N N   N   N N N    
South Dakota  N        N  
Tennessee   N N N N N  N 
Texas  N N N N N N N N 
Utah        N N 
Vermont  N        N  
Virginia N   N   N   N  N 
Washington N  N  N  N   N   N 
West Virginia    N        N   N 
Wisconsin       N N N N N 
Wyoming          
    
Appendix Table 5: 
S indicates state YRBS data for that state in that year 
Shaded Cell Indicates State Increased Cigarette Tax That Year or Previous Year 
Location  1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Alabama  S S S S S S S 
Alaska   S   S   S  
Arizona       S S 
Arkansas  S S S S S   S 
California   S S     
Colorado    S S   S   S 
Connecticut    S  S    S 
Delaware  S S S S S S S 
DC  S S S S S S S 
Florida     S S S S S 
Georgia S  S        S S 
Hawaii  S S S S S  S 
Idaho S  S    S  S  
Illinois  S S   S S   
Indiana      S  S S 
Iowa     S  S  S    S 
Kansas        S 
Kentucky S    S  S  S  S  S 
Louisiana S    S  S  S    
Maine S  S  S S S S S 
Maryland          S 
Massachusetts  S S S S S S S 
Michigan   S S S S S  S 
Minnesota         
Mississippi  S S S S S S S 
Missouri    S S S S S S 
Montana  S S S S S S  S 
Nebraska  S S   S S S S 
Nevada S S S S S S S 
New 
Hampshire 
S S S  S S S S 
New Jersey  S  S  S  S S   S 
New Mexico  S    S    S 
New York  S   S S S  S S 
North 
Carolina 
S S S   S S S 
North Dakota    S S S S S S 
Ohio  S S S S   S  S 
Oklahoma       S  S 
Oregon  S          
Pennsylvania             
Rhode Island    S  S   S  S  S 
South 
Carolina 
S S S S S   S 
South Dakota  S  S S S S S S 
Tennessee  S S S S S S S 
Texas     S  S  S 
Utah S  S  S S S S S 
Vermont  S  S S S S S S 
Virginia         
Washington            
West  Virginia  S S S S   S S 
Wisconsin  S    S S S S S 
Wyoming  S S S S S S S 
 
     
Appendix Table 6: 
Cities participating in the Local YRBS (X indicates Data for That Year) 
Shaded Cell Indicates State Increased Cigarette Tax That Year or Previous Year 
Location  1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
Los Angeles, CA    X X  X  X   
San Bernardino, 
CA 
    X X X X 
San Diego, CA  X  X X X X X X 
San Francisco, 
CA 
X  X X X X   X 
Denver,  CO   X       
Broward County, 
FL 
     X  X 
Ft. Lauderdale, 
FL 
X X X X X    
Hillsborough Cty, 
FL 
      X  
Miami,  FL  X X X X X X X 
Palm  Beach,  FL     X  X  X  X 
Orange County, 
FL 
     X  X 
Orlando,  FL      X    
DeKalb County, 
GA 
     X X 
Chicago, IL  X X X X X X X 
New Orleans, LA  X  X  X  X  X  X X 
Baltimore, MD      X     X 
Boston, MA  X X X X X X X 
Detroit, MI    X X X X X  X 
Jersey City, NJ  X  X  X       
Newark, NJ      X       
New York, NY  X   X X X  X X 
Charlotte,  NC        X 
Philadelphia,  PA  X X X X X X   
Memphis,  TN       X X 
Dallas,  TX  X X X X X X X 
Houston,  TX    X X X X    
Seattle, WA  X  X    X      
Milwaukee, WI        X X X 
 
 